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REFORMATION OF BURGLARY
THE DEVELOPMENT OF BURGLARY
At early common law, burglary was defined as the felony of "break-
mg and entering the dwelling of another in the nighttime with the in-
tent to commit a felony therein." 1 This crime was strictly defined and
enforced according to the above six elements,2 and was established for
the protection of the habitation.8 This concept of the security of the
dwelling protected by the establishment of a harshly-pumshed felony,
is unique to the Anglo-Saxon system of law for no legal systems other
than derivatives of Anglo-Saxon origins have any substantive criminal
offense of the seriousness or definition of common law burglary 4 The
idea of such security of the habitation is said to have developed from
the notion that a man's home was his castle and that while there, he was
to be disturbed unlawfully only at the expense of great risk of death.5
Paralleling the development of burglary in the common law, the in-
choate offense of attempt also developed.6 This offense provided that
when an act amounted to the pursuit of the consummation of a specific
1. W CLARK &, J. MARSHALL, LAW o CRIMES 870 (6th ed. 1958); R. PERKINS,
CRMIINAL LAW 149 (1957) [hereinafter cited as PERKINS].
2. Note, Statutory Burglary, The Magic of Four Walls and A Roof, 100 U. PA.
L. REv. 411 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Burglary].
3. H. BEST, CRuME AND TE CRiuINAL LAw IN THE UNrrED STATES 35 (1930); PERKINS,
supra note 1.
4. Statutory Burglary, supra note 2, at 424.
5. Annor, 43 A.L.R.2d 831, 834 (1955) in which the author states:
It is evident that the offense of burglary at common law was considered one
aimed at the security of the habitation rather than against property. That
is to say, it was the circumstance of midnight terror aimed toward a man or
his family who were m rightful repose m the sanctuary of the home, that was
punished, and not the fact that the intended felony was unsuccessful. Such
attempted Immunity extended to a man's dwelling or mansion house has been
said to be attributable to the early common-law principle that a man's home
is his castle. The jealousy with which the law guarded against any infringe-
ment of this ancient right of peaceful habitation is best illustrated by the
severe penalties which at common law were assessed against a person con-
victed of burglary, even though the enterprise, except for the essential ele-
ments of breaking and entering a mansion house or dwelling house at night
with intent to commit a felony therein, was unsuccessful.
6. N. Y. PENAL LAW art. 140, Practice Commentary 332 (McKinney 1967) [hereinafter
cited as Practice Commentary].
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crime, it could be pumshed as an attempt.7 The primary objective of
the creation of this inchoate crime was to prevent further harm by the
criminal actor.8
The crime of attempt at common law, however, contained tvo
serious defects.9 First, the act which was sufficient to constitute, an at-
tempt was so nearly the completion of the offense that there existed
the Scylla of apprehension too soon to convict the crimnal actor or the
Charybdis of risking the completion of the crime and thus suffering the
intended resultant harm.10 The second defect was found in the punish-
ment provided for attempt. At common law, this punishment was
very slight, and thus the criminal actor, who through the vigilance of
authorities or the intervening of prohibiting circumstances, was ap-
prehended while in the attempt, was caused to suffer a comparatively
mild punishment even though his intent and actions evidenced equal
danger to society as those of the criminal who actually completed the
crime intended."
At its inception, burglary bore a great similarity to this inchoate
crime of attempt since by definition, burglary involved the requisite
intent to commit an offense other than the specific burglary 12 This
similarity of burglary to the crime of attempt and the existence of the
two serious defects within the crime of attempt together produced a
unique judicial evolution."
Gradually, by court decisions and by legislation, the common law
crime of burglary was enlarged to include many more factual situations.x4
The element of actual breaking was enlarged to include constructive
breaking,15 and finally the requisite of a break was abolished entirely 16
7 PERKiNS, supra note 1, at 476.
8. Wechsler, Jones, & Korn, The Treatment of inchoate Crime n the Model Penal
Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 COLUM.
L. REv. 571, 572-73 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Wechsler].
9. Practice Commentary, supra note 6.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.1, Comment 55 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960); Wechsler,
supra note 8, at 571-72; Statutory Burglary, supra note 2, at 433.
13. Practice Commentary, supra note 6; MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, Comment
56.
14. Statutory Burglary, supra note 2 which contains a detailed and comprehensive
examination of the gradual enlargement of burglary from the original, narrow common
law offense to the present, extremely broad statutory offense.
15. Note, A Rationale of the Law of Burglary, 51 COLum. L. REv. 1009-15 (1951);
Statutory Burglary, supra note 2.
16. Annot, 23 A.L.R. 288 (1923).
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The requirement that the structure entered be a dwelling was enlarged
to include telephone booths, automobiles, department stores, and banki'7
In some penal statutes, even the requirement that the structure entered
be the habitat of another was abolished.'8 The element of nighttime was
either eliminated entirely from statutory burglary or limited to the
lughest degree of the offense. 9 Finally, many penal statutes enlarged
the requisite element of intent to include intent to commit any crime
whatsoever in addition to the burglary itself.20 This development of
much broader and more inclusive statutory burglary was developed
mainly to compensate for the two defects in the crime of attempt.2'
There exists persuasive argument that statutory burglary has been en-
larged to such an extent that it has become, in reality, a generalized law
of attempts,22 and there exists conclusive support for the proposition that
burglary is no longer aimed at the protection of the habitation. 3
THE MODERN CODES
A discussion of several recently enacted state penal code revisions will
further show that the present statutory provisions concerning burglary
are aimed primarily at the protection of property and the prevention of
personal injuries. This development, however, has produced results sat-
isfactory in neither logical construction nor practical criminal admmis-
tration. Serious anomalies have resulted which have been recognized and
deplored by a number of legal authors.24 A generalized law of attempts
has evolved which is logically inconsistent with our system of specific
attempts involving specific acts directed toward committing specific
17. Annot., 78 AL.R.2d 780 (1961); Note, Development of the Law of Burglary n
California, 25 S. CAL. L. REv. 75 (1951).
18. 4 Wnu-Am~un L.J. 285, 289 (1966).
19. Statutory Burglary, supra note 2, at 417.
20. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.58 (2) (1963); N. Y. PENAL LAw § 140.20 (McKinney
1967).
21. MODEL PENAL CoDn, supra note 12, Comment 56; Practice Commentary, supra
note 6.
22. Statutory Burglary, supra note 2, at 439.
23. H. BEST, supra note 3; W CLARK & J. MARsHALL, supra note 1; Note, supra note
17, at 77.
24. MOn.L PENAL CODE, supra note 12, Comment 56-57; Note, supra note 15, at 1030;
Statutory Burglary, supra note 2, at 411-45; Note, supra note 18.
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crimes.25 Furthermore, serious penalties provided for burglary would
appear absurd when contrasted with the penalties to which the crim-
inal actor may be subjected for the completion of the attempted crime.26
No totally satisfactory resolution of these difficulties, however, has thus
far been aclueved. One has only to examine some burglary statutes.
For example, m California breaking into the glove compartment of a
car is punishable by up to 15 years, while theft of the entire car is punish-
able at a maximum of 10 years.27 Also under burglary statutes not re-
quiring the dwelling to be that of another, one entering his own home
with the intent to contribute to the delinquency of his fifteen-year-old
babysitter would be guilty of burglary.28
Several states have recently revised their penal codes as the Model
Penal Code has been promulgated. The following discussion of the
Wisconsin, Minnesota, and New York penal revisions, in addition to
the Model Penal Code, demonstrates the current trends in burglary
statutes. Our purpose is to determine whether these trends correct the
serious problems inherent in statutory burglary
The Minnesota Penal Code was revised, effective as of 1965-
§ 609.58 Burglary
Subdivision 1. Definitions. For the purpose of this section:
(2) "Building" includes a dwelling or other structure suitable
for affording shelter for human beings or appurtenant to
or connected with a structure so adapted, and includes
portions of such structure as are separately occupied.
Subdivision 2. Acts constituting. Whoever enters a building
without the consent of the person in lawful possession, with
intent to commit a crime therein, commits burglary and may be
sentenced as follows:
(1) To imprisonment for not more than 20 years or to pay-
ment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both, if:
(a) When entering or while in the building, he possesses
25. PE RiNs, supra note 1, at 476, Statutory Burglary, supra note 2, at 439.
26. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 12, contains excellent examples of the disparity m-
cluding: " entering a henhouse to steal a chicken becomes a heinous offense, while
stealing a chicken at the henhouse door would be mere petty larceny."
27. MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1, Comments 55-56 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
28. Note, supra note 18.
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an explosive or tool to gain access to money or prop-
erty; or
(b) The building entered is a dwelling and he possesses
a dangerous weapon when entering or while in the
building or he commits an assault upon a person pres-
ent therein; or
(c) The portion of the building entered contains a bank-
ing business or other business of receiving securities
or other valuable papers for deposit or safekeeping,
the entry is with force or threat of force, the intent
is to steal or commit a felony therein.
(2) To imprisonment for not more than ten years or to pay-
ment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both, if the
building entered is a dwelling and another person not an
accomplice is present therein.
(3) In any other case, to imprisonment for not more than five
years or to payment of a fine of not more than $5,000, or
both, if the intent is to steal or comimt a felony or gross
msdemeanor or to imprisonment for not more than one
year or to payment of a fine of not more than $1,000, or
both, if the intent is to commit a misdemeanor.29
An examination of this statute reveals that the entry required must be
trespassory; thus, a shoplifter could not be convicted of burglary, nor
could a person entering his own home be convicted of burglary.30 The
definition given "building" is broad enough to encompass a variety of
structures81 The crime intended may be "any crime." 3 2 The type of
burglary described in this statute subject to the most severe penalty in-
cludes the entering of "a banking business or other business of receiving
securines or other valuable papers for deposit or safekeeping." " These
three observations indicate that this burglary statute, in keeping with
the current trend in other state penal codes, has established an offense
aimed at providing a crime of general attempt and insuring the protection
of property The statute also has provisions designed to protect per-
sons from injuries. 4 The only point at which the emphasis is upon
29. MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.58 (1963).
30. Id. § 609.58-1.
31. Id. § 60938-1 (2).
32. Id. 5 60938-2.
33. id. § 60938-2(i) (c).
34. Id. 5§ 60938-2(1) (a)-(b).
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the protection of the habitation is in a lesser-punished division of burg-
lary.85 This protection afforded the habitation is narrower than at com-
mon law since the building must be a dwelling and "another person not
an accomplice [must be] present therein" 11 This narrower construc-
ton can be interpreted as evidencing an intention to primarily protect
the individual rather than the habitation itself. Further general observa-
non reveals that there is no breaking requirement and no requirement
of mghttime in any degree of the offense.
The Minnesota Penal Code's burglary provision is therefore seen
to be substantially broad, encompassing some aspects of a general law
of attempts by including generally any crime as the intended crime
and by encompassing a variety of buildings in opposition to the ac-
cepted specific nature of the law of attempts. The provision of any
crime as the target offense also allows the anomalous result of the
burglary thus viewed as an attempt being punished far more severely
than other attempted crimes.
The penal code provisions concerning burglary recently enacted in
Wisconsin are somewhat narrower and reduce the problems connected
with enlarged burglary statutes to this degree:
§ 943.10 Burglary
(1) Whoever intentionally enters any of the following places
without the consent of the person in lawful possession
and with intent to steal or commit a felony therein may
be imprisoned not more than 10 years:
(a) Any building or dwelling; or
(b) An enclosed railroad car; or
(c) An enclosed portion of any ship or vessel; or
(d) A locked enclosed cargo portion of a truck or trailer;
or
(e) A room within any of the above.
(2) Whoever violates sub. (1) under any of the following
circumstances may be imprisoned not more than 20 years;
(a) While armed with a dangerous weapon; or
(b) While unarmed, but arms himself with a dangerous
weapon while still in the burglarized enclosure; or
(c) While in the burglarized enclosure opens, or attempts




to open, any depository by use of an -explosive; or
(d) While in the burglarized enclosure commits a 'battery
upon a person lawfully therein.
(3) For the purpose of this section, entry into a place dur-
ing the time when it is open to the general public is with
consent.
§ 943.11 Entry into locked vehicle
Whoever intentionally enters the locked and enclosed portion
or compartment of the vehicle of another without consent and
with intent to steal therefrom may be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year in county jail or
both 37
An examination of this statute shows that the breaking, dwelling, and
nighttime elements of common law burglary have been abolished. En-
try must be trespassory,-" however, and this narrower requisite elimi-
nates some illogical practical results enumerated previously Buildings
open to the public and entered at appropriate tunes are not included
m burglary offenses.89 The intent to commit a target offense has been
limited to "intent to steal or commit a felony therein." 4 Thus, the
disparity of punishment between burglary as an attempt and the in-
tended offense has been thereby limited. While the "places" in which
a burglary may occur as listed are quite numerous, entry into a locked
vehicle is treated separately from burglary, and a specific punishment
is provided therefor.4' This wide variety of places is indicative of the
purpose of protecting property, while the importance of avoiding
personal injuries is shown in the aggravating provisions which constitute
the highest degree of burglary provided by Wisconsin law. 2
Thus, to the extent that these provisions are narrower, they do re-
solve some of the anomalies of disparity of punishments between burg-
lary and intended offenses. Basically, however, these anomalies still
exist, since the statute is arguably designed to provide a wide general
37. Wis. STAT. ANN. 3 943.10 (1958).
38. Id. § 943.10 (1).
39. Id. § 943.10(3).
40. Id. 3 943.10(1)..
41. Id. 5 943.11.
42. Id. SS 943.10(2) (a)-(d).
1969]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW.: REVIEW
attempt offense for the protection -of property :and persons enclosed
within appropriate-structures.43
The Revised Penal Code of New York became effective in 1967
The burglary statute contained therein provides:
§ 140.00 Crimunal trespass and burglary; definitions of terms
The following definitions are applicable to this article:
1. "Premises" includes the term "building," as defined herein,
and any real property
2. "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes
any structure, vehicle or watercraft used for overnight
lodging of persons, or used by persons for carrying on busi-
ness therein. Where a building consists of two or more units
separately secured or occupied, each unit shall be deemed
both a separate building in itself and a part of the main
building.
3. "Dwelling" means a building which is usually occupied by
a person lodging therein-at night.
4. "Night" means the period between thirty minutes after sun-
set and thirty minutes before sunrise.
5. "Enter or remain unlawfully" A person "enters or remains
unlawfully" in or upon premises when he is not licensed or
privileged to do so. A person who, regardless of his intent,
enters or remains in or upon premises which are at the time
open to the public does so with license and privilege un-
less he defies a lawful order not to enter or remain, per-
sonally communicated to him by the owner of such prem-
ises or other authorized person. A license or privilege to
enter or remain in a building which is only partly open to
the public is not a license or privilege to enter or remain
in that part of the building which is not open to the public.
A person who enters or remains upon unimproved and ap-
parently unused land, which is neither fenced nor otherwise
enclosed in a manner designed to exclude intruders, does
so with license and privilege unless notice against trespass is
personally communicated to him by the owner of such land
or other authorized person, or unless such notice is given by
posting in a conspicuous manner. 44
43. It is indicative of the fact that the emphasis of burglary is upon the protection
of property that the offense of burglary is listed under "Crimes Against Property"
in the Wisconsin Penal Code.
44. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 140.00 (McKinney 1967).
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§ 140.20 Burglary in the third degree
A person is guilty of burglary in the third degree when he
knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent
to commit a crime therein.
Burglary in the third degree is a class D felony
§ 140.25 Burglary in the second degree
A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when he
knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent
to commit a crime therein, and when:
1. In affecting entry or while in the building or in immediate
flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
(a) Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes physical injury to any person who is not a
participant in the crime; or
(c) Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous
instrument; or
2. The building is a dwelling and the entering or remaining oc-
curs at mght.
Burglary in the second degree is a class C felony
§ 140.30 Burglary in the first degree
A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when he
knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling at mght
with intent to commit a crime therein, and when, in effecting
entry or while in the dwelling or in immediate flight therefrom,
he or another participant in the crime:
1. Is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon; or
2. Causes physical injury to any person who is not a par-
ticipant in the crime; or
3. Uses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous instru-
ment.
Burglary in the first degree is a class B felony 45
Criminal trespass provisions are also provided for those like offenses
in which the requisite intent to commit a crime cannot be found and
proven.e
45. Id. S§ 140.20, 140.25, 140.30.
46. Id. §§ 140.05, 140.10, 140.15.
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The introductory explanation of the New York statute states that
a substantive crime of burglary is maintained ". . .. because this be-
havior usually excites terror in the occupants and because of the great
probability that personal injuries might ensue." 47 This rationale im
mediately negates the concept of burglary as an offense against the
habitation.
Burglary, under the New York statute, is divided into three degrees.
The essential elements of the third degree are "(1) entering or re-
maimng, unlawfully in a building, and (2) with intent to commit a
crime therein." 48 Second degree burglary is third degree plus one of
the three aggravating factors or the entry or remaining is of a dwelling
in the nighttime.49 First degree burglary consists of entering or re-
raming in a dwelling at night with the presence of one of the three
aggravating factors.00 The definition of "building" is quite broad and
is clearly indicative of the emphasis upon the protection of property 51
The three aggravating factors are equally indicative of the emphasis
upon protection of individuals from injury 5r2 The entry or unlawful
remaining is strictly defined to connote trespassory entry only, 5 thus
eliminating -burglary in buildings open to the public and in buildings
owned by the criminal actor. The intended offense need not be "a
crime," 54 and thus the opportunity for disparity between pumshment
for burglary as an attempt and for the completed act intended offense
persists. A reasonable argument may also be made, considering the
variety of buildings in which second and third degree burglary may
be committed, that a general law of attempts is effected by this statute.
The New York statutory burglary provision is tightly reasoned and
well worded; it is an exemplary statutory provision of the enlarged
and expanded offense of statutory burglary as it has developed today
It is, however, demonstrably subject to the same objections as the other
statutes considered above.
The Model Penal Code, defining burglary in narrow terms., was
promulgated in 1962:
47. Id. art. 140, Practice Commentary 333.
48. Id.
49. Id. § 140.25.
50. Id. § 140.30.
51. Id. § 140.00(2).
52. Id. §§ 140.25(i)(a)-(c), 140.30(1)-(3).
53. Id. § 140.00(5).
54. Id. §§ 140.20, 140.25, 140.30.
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ARTICLE 221. BURGLARY AND OTHER CRIMINAL
INTRUSION
Section 221.0. Defimtions.
In this Article, unless a different meaning plainly is required:
(1) "occupied structure" means any structure, vehicle or place
adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for
carrying on business therein, whether or not a person is
actually present.
(2) "night" means the period between thirty minutes past sun-
set and thirty mnutes before sunnse.55
Section 221.1. Burglary
(1) Burglary Defined. A person is guilty of burglary if he
enters a building or occupied structure, or separately se-
cured or occupied portion thereof, with purpose to commit
a crime therein, unless the premises are at the time open to
the public or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter.
It is an affirmative defense to prosecution for burglary that
the building or structure was abandoned.
(2) Grading. Burglary is a felony of the second degree if it is
perpetrated in the dwelling of another at night, or if, in
the course of committing the offense, the actor:
(a) purposely, knowingly or recklessly inflicts or attempts
to inflict bodily injury on anyone; or
(b) is armed with explosives or a deadly weapon.
Otherwise, burglary is a felony of the third degree. An act
shall be deemed "in the course of committing" an offense if it
occurs in an attempt to commit the offense or in flight after the
attempt or commission.
(3) Multiple Convictions. A person may not be convicted both
for burglary and for the offense which it was his purpose
to commit after the burglarions entry or for an attempt
to commit that offense, unless the additional offense con-
stitutes a felony of the first or second degree.5 6
These statutory provisions abolish breaking as an element. The ex-
ception to entry, "unless the premises are at the time open to the public
or the actor is licensed or privileged to enter" definitely excludes
burglary in such places as open department stores and the criminal
actor's own home 7 Burglary is also limited to "occupied structures,"
55. MODEL PENAL CODE § 221.0 (1962).
56. Id. § 221.1.
57. ld. § 221.1(1).
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the burglary of which constitutes "invasion of premises under circum-
stances . likely to terrorize occupants." 58 This purpose is also evi-
denced by the fact that the highest degree of burglary is found when
the offense is committed in. the dwelling of another at night or when
aggravating factors likely to threaten life are present. This provision
limits the offense of burglary to criminal acts .more nearly in line with
the original purpose of the common law crime of burglary " The
tendency to provide a general law of attempts in buildings and struc-
tures is thereby lessened although this lessening is limited by the pro-
vision that the intended offense may be any crime.6 By defining the
enclosed space within which the criminal act is committed as an "oc-
cupied structure" rather than a "dwelling," and by expanding the
requisite intent to include the commission of any crime, the model
code has arguably transformed the law of burglary into a law compa-
rable to a general law of attempts. 61 The protection of persons as op-
posed to the protection of the habitation renders this burglary provision
vulnerable to the charge that such a general law of attempts is already
established. This vulnerability is increased by a consideration of that
provision which, by prohibiting conviction for both burglary and the
intended offense, more nearly aligns burglary with the law of attempts."
This criticism exists although the Model Penal Code has corrected the
two defects of the law of attempts by " moving the point of
criminality well back into the area of preparation to commit crime,
and [providing] severe penalties for attempts to commit grave
crimes." 3 The second criticism can still be made that illogical and
mequitable differences in punishment exist between the punishment for
burglary viewed as an attempt and for the completed intended offense,
since the intent may be to commit any crime.
The two major criticisms which have been made concerning the
recently revised burglary statutes have been that they provide seriously
different punishments between the burglary and the intended crime
and that, in effect, they establish a law of general attempts whuch is
directly contradictory to our established law of specific attempts. In a
58. Id. § 221.1, Comment 57 (Tent. Draft No. i1, 1960).
59. Id.
60. Id. § 221.1(1).
61. ld. S 221.0(1).
62. ld. § 221.1(3).
63. Id. S 221.1, Comment 57 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1960).
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final analysis, the anomalous differences in ,punishments devolve from
defining burglary to include an attempt'-of any' cime If the act of
burglary be considered a substantive crime iri'its own right by eliminat-
ing its attempt nature, then any relation between the penalty for the
burglary ant the penalty for the intended crime is irrelevant. Burglary,
however, cannot be truly a substantive crime in its own right as long
as statutory provisions construct burglary as a law of general attempt for
either offenses against persons or offenses against property
The authors of the comments to Tentative Draft Number 11 of the
Model Penal Code suggest that the best solution would be to eliminate
burglary as a distinct substantive offense if it were not for the idea
that the " centuries of history and a deeply embedded Anglo-
American conception like burglary cannot easily be discarded." '4 As
early as 1951, an author, deploring the creation of a "generalized crime
of attempt," suggested a model statute which completely abolished
the offense of burglary and instead provided 'for an offense of criminal
trespass of the dwelling of another and a system of aggravating factors
attached to the target crime.5
These two suggested reforms both recognize that burglary has no
logical place as a portion of the law of attempts and cannot be justi-
fied as such. Both advocate elimination of burglary as a substantive
offense, with the latter providing a lightly-punished form of criminal
trespass. This last, however, does not appear to be an acceptable solution.
The model burglary statute which this writer suggests would provide:
1. Anyone who unlawfully enters or remains in the dwelling
of another with the intent to commit a crime therein is
64. Id.
65. Statutory Burglary, supra note 2, at 445, in which the author proposed the follow-
ing model burglary statute:
(1) Anyone who unlawfully enters the dwelling of another shall be subject
to a fine, and/or imprisonment up to one year.
(2) Anyone who, in the course of any crime punishable by one year's im-
prisonment or more:
(a) enters the dwelling of another m which there is a person at the
time, or
(b) is armed with a deadly weapon, or so arms himself, or uses or
attempts to use explosives, or
(c)" commits an assault or otherwise injures another, or
(d) is accompanied by confederates actually present, shall be subject
to a penalty that shall not be more than double the penalty for the
crimes committed.
1969]
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guilty of burglary and is subject to punishment equal to
that provided for a felony.
2. Anyone who unlawfully enters or remains in the dwell-
ing of another is--guilty of crmunal trespass and is subject
to punishment equal to that provided for a misdemeanor
or less.
This proposed burglary provision would re-establish burglary as a
substantive offense against the habitation. The portions relating to the
law of attempt would be abolished, whether pertaining to the pro-
tection of persons or property The circumstance of the commission
of crimes involving a trespassory entry into buildings other than the
dwelling of another would be included as an aggravating factor un-
der the specific offense. Conviction for both burglary and the in-
tended crime would be permitted since both would be substantive of-
fenses. No comparison between the punishment provided for the
burglary and the intended crime would be made because burglary
would again be a substantive crime in its own right with no relation
to the law of attempts.
CONCLUSION
Burglary has undergone a long history of evolution. It was estab-
lished as a substantive offense against the habitation. It then comple-
mented the offense of attempt In providing some correction for its
two defects. This evolution, however, resulted in drastic enlargement
of statutory burglary, arguably into a generalized law of attempts, re-
sulting m chaotic and anomalous theoretical and practical results. A
detailed exammation of recent burglary statutes shows that, while some
narrowing of the offense of burglary has occurred, the attempt aspect
of the statutory offense has been allowed to remain. Thus, little of
the confusion and few of the undesirable aspects of statutory burglary
have been removed.
One proposed reform has advocated abolition of the offense of burg-
lary "6 The authors of the Model Penal Code, while stating that such
abolition was probably the most logically acceptable course, declined
to abolish the offense on the grounds that it has been deeply ingrained
into our judicial heritage. This writer, feeling that there is strong evi-
dence of a definte need for the substantive crime of burglary in today's
66. Statutory Burglary, supra note 2, at 444-45.
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society, proposes a model burglary statute which would remove the
attempt aspect from burglary while leaving a narrowly defined sub-
stantive crime. In this way the anomalous aspects of burglary will be
removed, and the strength of the basic burglary judicial heritage will
be channeled to fulfill a current need m criminal law.
SUSAN BUNDY COCKE
